

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

LORRAINE MAY LAMPTON, Individually,
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated
c/o Spangenberg Shibley & Liber LLP
1001 Lakeside Avenue East, Suite 1700
Cleveland, OH 44114

Plaintiff

vs.

ELITE HEALTH INSTITUTE LTD.
dba ELITE BODY AND LASER CENTER
c/o Ian Heyman, Registered Agent
81 Mill Street, Suite 300
Gahanna OH 43230

Defendant

CASE NO.

JUDGE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Lorraine May Lampton brings this class action against Defendant Elite Health Institute LTD. dba Elite Body and Laser Center and alleges as follows upon personal knowledge as to herself and her own acts and experiences, and, as to all other matters, upon information and belief, including investigation conducted by her attorneys.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This is a putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 *et seq.*, (“TCPA”) and 47 CFR § 64.1200, arising from Defendant’s knowing and willful violations of the TCPA.

2. To promote its beauty services, Defendant engages in unsolicited text message advertising without the requisite express written consent.

3. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant’s unlawful conduct. Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on behalf of herself and Class Members, as defined

below, and any other available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the unlawful actions of Defendant.

4. Plaintiff is, and at all times relevant hereto was, an individual and a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39), a citizen and resident of Franklin County, Ohio.

5. Defendant is, and at all times relevant hereto was, an Ohio company and a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39) that maintains its primary place of business and headquarters at 60 Powell Road, Lewis Center, Ohio 43035. Defendant directs, markets, and provides business activities throughout the State of Ohio.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as Plaintiff alleges violations of a federal statute. Jurisdiction is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) because Plaintiff alleges a national class, which will result in at least one class member belonging to a different state than that of Defendant. Plaintiff seeks up to \$1,500.00 (one thousand five hundred dollars) in damages for each call-in violation of the TCPA, which, when aggregated among a proposed class numbering in the tens of thousands, or more, exceeds the \$5,000,000.00 (five million dollars) threshold for federal court jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). Therefore, both the elements of diversity jurisdiction and CAFA jurisdiction are present.

7. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) because Defendant is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction, and because Defendant provides and markets its services within this district thereby establishing sufficient contacts to subject it to personal jurisdiction. Further, on information and belief, Defendant has sent the automated calls complained of by Plaintiff to other individuals within this judicial district, such that some of Defendant’s acts in making such calls have occurred within this district, subjecting Defendant to jurisdiction in the State of Ohio.

THE TCPA

8. The TCPA prohibits: (1) any person from calling a cellular telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system; (3) without the recipient's prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).

9. The TCPA exists to prevent communications like the ones described within this Complaint. *See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC*, 132 S. Ct. 740, 744 (2012).

10. In an action under the TCPA, a plaintiff must show only that the defendant "called a number assigned to a cellular telephone service using an automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice." *Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2012), *aff'd*, 755 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2014).

11. The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") is empowered to issue rules and regulations implementing the TCPA. According to the FCC's findings, calls in violation of the TCPA are prohibited because, as Congress found, automated or prerecorded telephone calls are a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls, and such calls can be costly and inconvenient. The FCC also recognized that wireless customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used.

12. In 2012, the FCC issued an order further restricting automated telemarketing calls, requiring "prior express written consent" for such calls to wireless numbers. *See In the Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1838 ¶ 20 (Feb. 15, 2012) (emphasis added).

13. To obtain express written consent for telemarketing calls, a defendant must establish that it secured the plaintiff's signature in a form that gives the plaintiff a "'clear and conspicuous disclosure' of the consequences of providing the requested consent....and [the plaintiff] having received this information, agrees unambiguously to receive such calls at a telephone number the [plaintiff]

designates.” *In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1837 ¶ 18, 1838 ¶ 20, 1844 ¶ 33, 1857 ¶ 66, 1858 ¶ 71 (F.C.C. Feb. 15, 2012).

14. The TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC define “telemarketing” as “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12). In determining whether a communication constitutes telemarketing, a court must evaluate the ultimate purpose of the communication. *See Golan v. Veritas Entm’t, LLC*, 788 F.3d 814, 820 (8th Cir. 2015).

15. “Neither the TCPA nor its implementing regulations ‘require an explicit mention of a good, product, or service’ where the implication of an improper purpose is ‘clear from the context.’” *Id.* (citing *Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.*, 705 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2012)).

16. “‘Telemarketing’ occurs when the context of a call indicates that it was initiated and transmitted to a person for the purpose of promoting property, goods, or services.” *Golan*, 788 F.3d at 820 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)(iii) & 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12)); *In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 F.C.C. Rcd at 14098 ¶ 141, 2003 WL 21517853, at *49).

17. The FCC has explained that calls motivated in part by the intent to sell property, goods, or services are considered telemarketing under the TCPA. *See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶¶ 139-142 (2003). This is true whether call recipients are encouraged to purchase, rent, or invest in property, goods, or services during the call *or in the future*. *Id.*

18. In other words, offers “that are part of an overall marketing campaign to sell property, goods, or services constitute” telemarketing under the TCPA. *See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶ 136 (2003).

19. If a call is not deemed telemarketing, a defendant must nevertheless demonstrate that it obtained the plaintiff's prior express consent. *See In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7991-92 (2015) (requiring express consent “for non-telemarketing and non-advertising calls”).


20. The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) is empowered to issue rules and regulations implementing the TCPA. According to the FCC's findings, calls in violation of the TCPA are prohibited because, as Congress found, automated or prerecorded telephone calls are a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls, and such calls can be costly and inconvenient. The FCC also recognized that wireless customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used.

21. A defendant must demonstrate that it obtained the plaintiff's prior express consent. *See In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7991-92 (2015) (requiring express consent “for non-telemarketing and non-advertising calls”).

22. Further, the FCC has issued rulings and clarified that consumers are entitled to the same consent-based protections for text messages as they are for calls to wireless numbers. *See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.*, 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The FCC has determined that a text message falls within the meaning of ‘to make any call’ in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)”).

FACTS

23. On or about November 14, 2019 and November 25, 2019, Defendant caused the following automated text messages to be transmitted to Plaintiff's cellular telephone ending in 1501 ("1501 Number"):



24. The 1501 Number has been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry since May 2, 2014.

25. At the time Plaintiff received these calls and messages she was the subscriber and/or sole user of the 1501 Number.

26. The 1501 Number is Plaintiff's personal cell phone number and not a business phone number.

27. Defendant's text messages and calls constitute telemarketing/advertising because they promote Defendant's business, goods, and services.


28. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted by text messages using an ATDS.

29. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant's text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. The messages include no personal identifiers and are formatted in a generic manner.

30. The number used by Defendant (614-662-1814) is known as a "long code," a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages *en masse*, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual.

31. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code.

32. Additionally, when Plaintiff replied back with the response "Stop!!", she received the following automated message in response from the ATDS Defendant used:



This automated response was sent by the ATDS automatically as an acknowledgment of Plaintiff's stop request.

33. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district.

34. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement.

35. Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff additional harm, including invasion of privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s call also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

PROPOSED CLASSES

36. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated.

37. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the Classes defined as follows:

NO CONSENT CLASS: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message using the same type of equipment used to send text messages to Plaintiff, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number for the purpose of promoting and/or advertising Defendant’s goods and/or services.

DO NOT CALL CLASS: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this Complaint: (1) were sent a text message or phone call by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of advertising and/or promoting Defendant’s products and services.

38. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the Class definitions as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery.

39. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes but believes the Class Members number in the several thousands, if not more.

NUMEROSITY

40. Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed automated calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the United States without their prior express consent. The Members of the Classes, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

41. The exact number and identities of the Members of the Classes are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class Members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant's call records.

COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT

42. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to Members of the Classes which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Members of the Classes. Among the questions of law and fact common to the members of the Classes are:

- a) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff's and Class Members' cellular telephones using an ATDS;
- b) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls;
- c) Whether Defendant's conduct was knowing and willful;
- d) Whether Defendant initiated telemarketing calls to telephone numbers listed on the National Do Not Call Registry;
- e) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and
- f) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.

43. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff's claim that Defendant routinely transmits calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class Members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.

TYPICALITY

44. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class Members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories.

PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE CLASS MEMBERS

45. Plaintiff is a representative who will fully and adequately assert and protect the interests of the Classes and has retained competent counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes.

COMMON QUESTIONS PREDOMINATE

46. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), the previously articulated common issues of fact and law predominate over any question solely affecting individual Class members

PROCEEDING VIA CLASS ACTION IS SUPERIOR AND ADVISABLE

47. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit because individual litigation of the claims of all Members of the Classes is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. While the aggregate damages sustained by the Classes are in the millions of dollars, the individual damages incurred by each Member of the Classes resulting from Defendant's wrongful conduct are too small to warrant the expense of individual lawsuits. The likelihood of individual Class Members prosecuting their own separate claims is remote, and, even if every Member of the Classes could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases.

48. Furthermore, allowing the issues to be adjudicated in a piecemeal fashion likely would result in certain Class Members who are not parties to individual adjudications having their rights impaired or impeded without notice or adequate representation.

49. The prosecution of separate actions by Members of the Classes would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. For example,

one court might enjoin Defendant from performing the challenged acts, whereas another may not. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interests of the Class, although certain class members are not parties to such actions.

DEFENDANT HAS ACTED ON GROUNDS THAT APPLY GENERALLY TO THE CLASS

50. Defendant has acted or refused to act in respects generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making appropriate final and injunctive relief with regard to the members of the Classes as a whole.

COUNT I

**Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class)**

51. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

52. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system ... to any telephone number assigned to a ... cellular telephone service” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

53. The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (hereinafter “ATDS”) as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” *Id.* at §227(a)(1).

54. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used an ATDS to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined above.

55. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made.

56. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an ATDS to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other Members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent.

57. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing.

58. As a result of Defendant's conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other Members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of \$500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the Members of the Class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. *Id.*

COUNT II
Violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class)

59. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

60. It is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “initiate any telephone call...using an automatic telephone dialing system...To any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1)(iii).

61. Additionally, it is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “[i]nitiate, or cause to be initiated, any telephone call that includes or introduces an advertisement or constitutes telemarketing, using an automatic telephone dialing system...other than a call made with the prior express written consent of the called party or the prior express consent of the called party when the call is made ...” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2).

62. Defendant transmitted calls using an automatic telephone dialing system to the telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class without their prior express written consent.

63. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express written consent to call the telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made.

64. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 64.1200(a) by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the telephones of Plaintiff and the other Members of the putative Class without their prior express consent.

65. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express written consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that it was using an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing.

66. As a result of Defendant's conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other Members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of \$500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. *Id.*

67. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class had not given prior express consent to receive its messages to their telephones the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other Members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.

COUNT III
Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)

68. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.

69. The TCPA's implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that "[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation" to "[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government."

70. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”

71. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.”

72. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c).

73. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.

74. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to \$500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.

75. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Classes, prays for the following relief:

- a) An order certifying this case as a class action on behalf of the Classes as defined above, and appointing Plaintiff as the representative of the Classes and Plaintiff's counsel as Class Counsel;
- b) An award of actual and statutory damages for Plaintiff and each Member of the Classes;
- c) As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, *et seq.*, and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Member of the Class \$500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3);
- d) An injunction prohibiting Defendant from initiating calls to telephone numbers listed on the National Do Not Call Registry;
- e) As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, *et seq.*, and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, Plaintiff seeks for herself and each member of the Class treble damages, as provided by statute, up to \$1,500.00 for each and every violation pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3);
- f) An order declaring that Defendant's actions, as set out above, violate the TCPA;
- g) An injunction requiring Defendant to cease all unsolicited call activity, and to otherwise protect the interests of the Class;
- h) An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using, or contracting the use of, an ATDS without obtaining, recipient's consent to receive calls made with such equipment; and
- i) Such further and other relief as the Court deems necessary.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff and Class Members hereby demand a trial by jury.

DOCUMENT PRESERVATION DEMAND

Plaintiff demands that Defendant take affirmative steps to preserve all records, lists, electronic databases, or other itemization of telephone numbers associated with Defendant and the calls as alleged herein.

Date: December 28, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Stuart E. Scott

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